elwin@sytadel:~$ ▋
sytadel-suite
Security and identity control plane for teams building with AI agents.
- TypeScript
- NestJS
- PostgreSQL
- Docker
- LangGraph
- MCP
# nota: Actively developed product: the repo holds working services and prototypes, not a production-ready hosted runtime. Scale metrics don't apply yet — the honest story is the security model and the architecture.
## problem
Teams building software and automations with AI agents have to rebuild trust infrastructure from scratch: identity and multi-tenancy, policy enforcement, secrets and vault, tamper-evident audit, agent identity, MCP and human approval of sensitive actions.
- It's expensive security work, easy to get wrong, and a distraction from the real business domain.
- Getting it wrong stays invisible until it's too late: a cross-tenant leak, an altered log, an exposed secret.
## architecture
A monorepo of independently deployable services orchestrated with docker-compose. Every request is authenticated at the edge, authorized against per-tenant policy, and only reaches the vault as a signed service-to-service call.
- auth-api — identity, tenants and memberships; the single source of truth of the identity plane.
- zerotrust-api — enforcement gateway: validates the JWT, resolves per-tenant policy and signs the downstream call.
- securechain-vault — documents, encryption, tamper-evident audit and notary.
- billing-api — plans, metering and entitlement sync.
- sytadel-mcp-server — exposes typed tools over the identity plane for MCP clients.
- No cross-service foreign keys: services resolve tenants/memberships against auth-api's internal directory.
## technical decisions
- Tamper-evident audit: SHA-256 hash chain, append-only enforced at the DB (trigger + REVOKE), concurrency-safe (pg_advisory_xact_lock), and anti-truncation checkpoints anchored with RFC 3161 timestamps.
- Document notarization: a real Merkle tree (RFC 6962) + RFC 3161 timestamps, with an honest SIMULATED fallback when no TSA is configured — never a fake proof.
- Encryption at rest: AES-256-GCM envelope encryption, per-tenant data keys (DEK) and a random IV per operation.
- Zero-trust service-to-service: no service trusts an unauthenticated or unsigned request; identity is re-derived from a verified JWT and carried in a signed canonical request.
- AI as a policy compiler: an LLM translates natural language → RBAC, reviews access and classifies session anomalies — all with evals (precision/recall, cost, latency).
- MCP + human-in-the-loop: a LangGraph agent proposes access decisions that a person applies.
## results
The project's guiding rule: the MVP may be incomplete, but it must not violate tenant isolation, access control, document integrity or auditability.
- Tenant isolation enforced server-side from the verified token, never from client-supplied input.
- Smoke tests that walk the auth → zerotrust → vault flow, including a negative case (creating a tenant in the vault returns 409 because that's owned by auth-api).
- The shared base that made it possible to extract @elwinernst/nest-auth, the npm package for JWT verification shared across services.